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ABSTRACT 
 
An unusual feature of the management of wilderness and other natural areas is that price is 
rarely used to ration recreational access. This often leads to queuing for access. At the same 
time there is often a relatively poor level of infrastructure provided for recreation. This paper 
argues that it is the relatively high level of public and political involvement in the 
management of wilderness and other natural areas that is ultimately responsible for the 
particular way in which recreational access is allocated. This introduces two ‘biases’ into 
managerial objectives. Queuing and infrastructure distortion are the symptom of these biases. 
 
JEL Code: Q26; ePrint Code : 340200.
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Rationing Recreational Access to Wilderness and Other 
Natural Areas 
 
It is common for managers of publicly owned wilderness and other natural areas to 
limit the level of recreational access to these areas. The justification given for restricting 
access is to limit environmental degradation and congestion that is caused by recreation. 
Legislation usually requires managers to limit these effects.  For example, the United States 
Wilderness Act requires lands to be managed “for the use and enjoyment of the American 
people” and “for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character” 
(Brunson, 1998). With increased use these goals become incompatible. Some rationing of 
recreational access is required to maintain the wilderness character of natural areas. For 
instance, management often imposes use limits on trails in popular and/or sensitive areas. Use 
limits are imposed by park management in the backcountry of Yosemite and Denali National 
Parks in the United States. They are also imposed on the Milford Track (South Island of New 
Zealand) and on the Overland Track (Tasmania, Australia). 
An unusual feature of the management of publicly owned wilderness and other natural 
areas is that price is rarely used to ration recreational access. In the case in which a non-zero 
price is charged for access, it is usually well below the market clearing level. For instance, in 
the United States price is rarely used to eliminate the excess demand for walking trails in 
wilderness areas, even though charging for recreational access is permitted under the 2004 
US Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (USREA).1 2  
                                                 
1 Scope existed under the previous US legislation, the 1996 Fee Demonstration Program, to charge for 
recreational access to wilderness areas. 
2 Similarly no fee is charged for the use of popular New Zealand trails such as the Milford Track. Fees are 
unusual for access to Australian wilderness. A fee was recently introduced for access to the Overland Track, but 
it is insufficient to eliminate excess demand.  
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The absence of market clearing prices leads to queuing in popular areas.3 From an economic 
perspective the time cost associated with queuing is purely a waste of resources. At the same 
time there is often a relatively poor level of infrastructure provided to support recreation. 
Infrastructure includes visitor centres, access routes to the natural area, trail development, 
trail marking, provision of huts, toilet facilities etc. One indication of this low level of 
infrastructure is the maintenance backlog present in many reserves. However restrictions on 
infrastructure levels, particularly in the backcountry of national parks, are often embedded 
into management plans through a system of zoning. Often a management plan does not allow 
any infrastructure in a zone which is designated ‘wilderness’. The extent of infrastructure in 
the park is set by determining the extent of the zones. 
This paper argues that it is the relatively high level of public involvement in the 
management of wilderness and other natural areas (through various political processes) that is 
ultimately responsible for the particular way in which recreational access is allocated and 
infrastructure level determined. Public involvement in the operation of national parks has a 
long history. Most public lands which incorporate wilderness and other natural areas are run 
according to management plans, and these frequently call for public and/or recreational user 
involvement in decision making. For instance, the USREA requires US federal agencies to 
involve the public before introducing or changing a fee. Such involvement introduces two 
‘bias’’ into managerial objectives.  
The first bias in managerial objectives is one in favour of politically dominant classes 
of users. Public representatives are often disproportionately drawn from particular class of 
users. For example, user representatives on consultative committees are more likely to be 
drawn from local communities than from distant communities.  There are three reasons this 
                                                 
3 Queuing can take many forms, depending on the rationing mechanism adopted. For example, suppose places 
on a trail are limited. If permits on the trail are available only from the park on the day that the walk 
commences, a queue will literally form outside the park office. In this event, prospective walkers may have to 
wait a number of days simply to obtain a permit before walking. This is the case for popular units (zones) of 
Denali National Park during summer months. Alternatively park management may allow bookings. There are 
two ways the market will clear in this case. First, prospective walkers will attempt to book very far in advance to 
ensure a place on the track, and then be forced to live with the inflexibility this imposes. For instance, Yosemite 
National allows bookings for a proportion of the free permits to use backcountry trails. These are often booked 
out far in advance. For example, at 23 March 2007 no reservations were available on the Happy Isles-Little 
Yosemite Valley trail on 80 of the 93 days between 25 May to 25 August 2007. (Source: 
http:/home.nps.gov/archive/yose/rptFullTrailheadDates.htm, accessed on 23 March 2007.) Places on the Mt. 
Whitney Main Trail in the Inyo National Forest are initially allocated by lottery in February for the period 1 
May to 1 November. This allocation method imposes “queuing” cost from inflexibility and misallocation across 
consumers. Whichever non-price rationing mechanism is used, it will generate queuing costs which are 
sufficient to clear the market. 
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may be the case: (i) national (federal) legislation, such as the USREA, may require local 
community involvement4, (ii) in some jurisdictions the management of the natural area is 
appointed by local jurisdictions, and thus the local political process will inevitably be biased 
in favour of locals 5, and (iii) individual ‘tourists’ are likely to make far fewer visits than 
locals and thus (individually) have less of an interest in the management of the natural area. 
Similarly, regular recreational users of a particular natural area are likely to be more 
politically organised than casual users, and thus will exert a disproportionate political 
influence. 
The second bias relates to the weighting of profit in managerial objectives. The 
dominance of user interest in the political process means that governments are often willing 
to subsidise recreation. More specifically, management assigns profit a lower weighting in its 
objectives than it assigns the benefit of recreation to the dominant group of users.  Thus the 
objectives that guide the management of wilderness and other natural areas are not those of a 
textbook ‘social welfare maximiser’. Rather, in undertaking pricing and infrastructure 
decisions, management under-weights profits and favours a dominant group (or dominant 
groups) of users.  
A model is presented which captures the above bias in managerial objectives. 
Queuing may arise in this model when profits are under-weighted and the dominant user 
group has a lower opportunity cost of time than other user groups. In this case queuing can 
bias the allocation of access toward the dominant group. Some features of recreation in 
natural areas suggest that the dominant group might have a relatively low opportunity cost of 
time. Wilderness areas, for example, are situated in locations that are remote from 
industrialised and economically dynamic areas. In this event, locals are thus likely to have a 
lower hourly wage rate than tourists. Similarly, those users who have a relatively low cost of 
time face a lower cost associated with becoming involved in clubs and societies. This might 
result in their preferences having a greater weight in managerial objectives  
                                                 
4 Under the USREA, the US Forestry Service and US Bureau of Land Management must establish, regionally 
based committees to advise on matters concerning recreation fees. In addition, under the USREA, the intention 
of an agency to change or introduce a fee need only be notified locally. 
5 In Australia management of wilderness and natural areas is a state government responsibility. The authority 
that manages Tasmanian wilderness areas (Tasmanian National Parks Service) established a committee of local 
interest groups (Bushwalking and Track Review) to advise on issues related to recreational access to wilderness 
areas. 
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The dominant group of users is also likely to have a greater familiarity with a 
particular natural area or outdoor recreation in general. This group is relatively less reliant on 
infrastructure. For instance, locals are familiar with the national parks in their region, and 
thus receive less benefit from signage than do tourists. Similarly the locals may be more used 
to local terrain, and thus less reliant on track works, shelters and visitor centres than are 
tourists. This difference in benefit of infrastructure between locals and tourists provides 
another mechanism by which management can advantage the dominant group. By reducing 
infrastructure, management can raise the total cost of access to tourists relative to that of 
locals. When total access is restricted, locals are able to achieve greater access by restricting 
infrastructure and thus lowering the demand from tourists. 
Queuing and infrastructure distortion are, in effect, covert mechanisms to advantage 
users who have a relatively low opportunity cost of time. The discriminating effect of these 
mechanisms is not immediately apparent, as they do not overtly treat members of different 
user groups differently.  However, it is shown in this paper that these mechanisms would not 
be used by management if it could overtly engage in third degree price discrimination by 
charging different fees to members of different user groups. When third degree price 
discrimination can be used, price bears the full burden of advantaging one group over another. 
In practice management might not be able to use third degree price discrimination. It may not 
be able to distinguish classes of users for the purpose of setting differential prices. 
Alternatively, political or legal constraints may preclude the overt favouritism implied by the 
implementation by management of third degree discrimination. In any event, it will be shown 
that adoption of third degree price discrimination does not yield efficiency (in spite of it 
precluding queuing and infrastructure distortion) if management distorts its pricing structure 
to advantage the dominant group of users.  
The economics literature has addressed the issue of the efficient pricing of outdoor 
recreation. Fischer and Krutilla (1972) identify the optimal recreational use level (carrying 
capacity) as occurring at the use level where the marginal benefit from recreation equals the 
marginal cost (which includes the ‘external’ costs of congestion and environmental 
degradation).6 Wilman (1986) considers efficient allocation across groups that differ in their 
willingness to pay. Turner (2000) considers the efficient allocation across groups that 
undertake differing activities. This paper differs from these studies by focusing on the method 
                                                 
6 See also Alldredge (1973) and Wagar (1974). 
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management uses to allocate recreational access in practice, rather than focussing on 
determining the efficient level of recreational access.  
Section 1 of this paper introduces a model of managerial decision-making regarding 
recreation in wilderness and other natural areas. Section 2 derives the equilibrium of the 
model under a number of institutional settings. Using these results, Section 3 discusses policy 
options. The paper concludes with Section 4.  
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1. Management of recreational access 
 
Consider a natural area that is used for recreation by two types of users. Each 
recreational trip imposes a total cost, pi, on type i users: 
 
pi(P,a,y) = P + aiwi + awi - tiy    (1) 
 
where i=1,2, P is the price of access, a is the time spent queuing, ai is the total remaining time 
(including travel time) spent on the trip with zero infrastructure, wi is the wage of the type i 
users, ti is the time saving  and y is the level of infrastructure. Formally the term tiy represents 
the value of time saved by the presence of infrastructure. The term, tiy, could also be 
interpreted, more loosely, as a measure of the additional convenience infrastructure provides. 
Denote the consumer surplus of type i users as vi(pi). Use, xi, by type i users is given 
by: 
 
xi(pi) = - v′i(pi)        (2) 
 
Let total demand, x(P,a,y), be given by: 
  
x(P,a,y) ≡ x1(p1)+x2(p2) = x1(P+ (a+a1)w1-t1y)+x2(P+ (a+a2)w2-t2y)  (3) 
 
The profit made from recreation by the management of the resource is: 
 
Π(P,a,y) = (P-c) x(P,a,y) – Y(y)     (4) 
 
where c is marginal use cost and Y(y) is the (pecuniary) cost of infrastructure level y. 
Assume that Y′(y)>0 and  Y″(y)≥0. 
Management decisions influence environmental quality. Increased use can lead to 
environmental degradation. Infrastructure has the potential to protect against such 
degradation. For instance, track hardening can halt erosion on a high use trail. Let the benefit 
of environmental quality be denoted g(x,y). Environmental quality is assumed to decrease the 
total number of uses and increases with y, the level of infrastructure, i.e. g1<0 and g2>0.  
  7
The objective of the manager may be differentially influenced (or ‘captured’) by the 
different groups of users. The manager may also be under pressure from government to 
minimise the extent to which recreation is subsidised, or possibly even to return a profit from 
recreation. In addition, legislation usually requires management to protect environmental 
quality. In the spirit of Evans and Garber (1988) and Sharkey and Sibley (1993) assume that 
the manager has a utility function which is the weighted sum of these influences: 
 
M(P,a,y) = m1v1(p1) + m2v2(p2) +  m3Π(P,a,y) + m4g(x(P,a,y),y)  (5) 
 
where mi∈[0,1] are the relevant weightings. The weightings reflect the relative strength of the 
various influences on manager motivations. They ultimately reflect the institutional 
environment, which will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These effects are exogenous 
for the purpose of analysing the pricing decision.  
This paper is not concerned with analysing the impact of the relative balance of profit 
and environmental quality in managerial objectives. It is thus useful to define the operational 
surplus, π, as the following sum of pecuniary profit and the benefit of environmental quality: 
 
π(P,a,y) = Π(P,a,y) + q(x(P,a,y),y)    (6) 
 
where q(x(P,a,y),y)≡ (m4/m3)g(x(P,a,y),y). The function q(x,y) measures environmental 
quality in units of ‘profit’. Thus the operational surplus measures the net benefit of the non-
recreation activities from the perspective of management. In this case the managerial 
objective function (or utility), (5), can be written as: 
 
M(P,a,y) = m1v1(p1) + m2v2(p2) +  m3π(P,a,y)   (7) 
 
In reality the weights in (7), which represent managerial objectives, will be the outcome a 
complex interaction of legislative restrictions, funding and political motivations by 
government and the controlling government agency (e.g. National Parks Service), local 
management and various community organisations. However the outcomes of these processes 
are succinctly captured by (7). Bargaining between user groups, local management, 
government agencies and the government are, therefore, subsumed into the manager’s utility 
(objective) function.  
  8
The above model is best analysed by considering special cases of managerial objectives:  
 
Definition 1:  A manager is called: 
(i)  unbiased if m1 = m2 = 1;  
(ii)  captured if m1 = 1 and m2 = 0;  
(iii)  customer disinterested if m1 = m2 = 0;  
(iv)  operations orientated  if m3 = 1;  
(v)  operations indifferent if m3 < 1. 
 
The manager would act to maximise social welfare if they are unbiased and operations 
orientated. If “locals” (type 1 users) dominate decision making, managers are captured, 
operations indifferent. Managers are operations maximising if they are customer disinterested 
and operations orientated. 
If price is set below the market clearing level queuing occurs. Queuing time is 
obviously non-negative, so: 
 
a ≥ 0       (8) 
 
The managerial optimisation problem is: 
 
max
P a y
 M(P,a,y) subject to (8)    (9) 
 
The first order conditions of the optimisation problem (9) are given in the appendix. 
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2. Equilibrium with various managerial biases 
 If management is unbiased and operations orientated then it acts to maximise the 
social surplus. In this case the equilibrium price, queuing and level of infrastructure provision 
are efficient. The following proposition characterises this outcome 
Proposition 1: Suppose management is unbiased and operations orientated  
(m1= m2= m3 =1). Then management sets the efficient price: 
 
P = c – q1(x,y)     (10) 
 
Management sets the efficient level of infrastructure, which is given by:   
 
Y′(y*) = q2(x(P,0,y*),y*) + t1x1(P*+ a1w1-t1y*)+t2x2(P*+ a2w2-t2y*) (11) 
 
There is no queuing. 
Condition (10) is the usual efficiency condition that price equals marginal cost.  As queuing 
represents wasted resources, the efficient level of queuing is zero. Equation (11) states that 
the level of infrastructure is efficient when its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost. The 
marginal benefit is measured by the sum of the marginal improvement in environmental 
quality from an increase in infrastructure and the increase in consumer surplus that 
accompanies an increase in infrastructure.  
The equilibrium described by proposition 1 is illustrated in figure 1. The demand 
curve for user i, xi(p i*) is shown, where:  
 
p i* = P+ aiwi-tiy*     (12) 
 
And where the level of infrastructure, y*, is assumed to be chosen efficiently. Queuing is 
assumed zero. Total demand is given by x(P,0,y*). The equilibrium (and efficient) price P* 
occurs at the point at which the demand curve cuts the (vertical section) of the marginal cost. 
At this price, type i users consume x i* and total use is x*. 
The following definition is useful in describing movements away from the efficient 
outcome: 
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Definition 2: Infrastructure is said to be downwardly (un-, upwardly) distorted if in 
equilibrium an increase in infrastructure, while holding total use and queuing constant, 
increases (leave unchanged, lowers) the social surplus. 
It is shown in the mathematical appendix that the condition for the presence of downwardly 
(un-, upwardly) distorted infrastructure is: 
 
Y′(y) < (=,>) q2(x(P,a,y),y)+t1x1(P+(a+a1)w1-t1y)+t2x2(P+(a+a2)w2-t2y) (13) 
 
Infrastructure is downwardly distorted if, in equilibrium, the sum of the marginal 
environmental quality and marginal consumer surplus of infrastructure is greater than its 
marginal cost. 
Many present institutional arrangements cause management to be captured and 
operations indifferent. The following proposition highlights the salient predictions of the 
model under these circumstances: 
Proposition 2: Suppose management is captured and operations indifferent (m1=1, 
m2=0, m3<1). Then: 
(i) Infrastructure is downwardly (upwardly) distorted if t1<(>)t2.  
(ii) A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for queuing is that w1<w2.  
(iii) Suppose wi=αti, α>0. If queuing is present then infrastructure is chosen so that 
Y′(y)=q2(x,y).  
Proposition 2(i) can be explained using figure 1. Infrastructure distortion allows management 
to reallocate use to advantage type 1 users relative to type 2 users. To show this, suppose that 
management were to initially set the efficient combination of price, queuing and 
infrastructure. Now define: 
 
δpi  ≡ awi – ti(y-y*).      (14) 
 
δpi  represents the variations of pi from p i*. A reduction in infrastructure below the efficient 
level causes δpi to be positive. Thus pi falls, leading to a fall in xi. Assuming t1<t2 then δp1< 
δp2. In figure 1 this is shown as a fall in total use from x* to x_1, and a fall in use of type i 
from x i* to x
_
i
1.  Now to compensate for the rise in pi on demand, price can be lowered to P1, at 
which point the initial use level (x*) is again achieved. The combination of the fall in y and P 
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is that, in equilibrium, p1< p1* and p2> p2* and thus x1(p1)> x1(p1*) and x2(p2)<x2(p2*). The 
consumer surplus of type 1 users is raised relative to the efficient allocation while that of  
type 2 users is lowered. The effect on profit is ambiguous. Price, and thus revenue, is lowered.  
However the cost of infrastructure has also been lowered. 
 A similar explanation can be provided for proposition 2(ii). Again starting from the 
efficient allocation, an increase in queuing raises p2 more than p1 provided w1<w2. A 
reduction in P can restore the initial use level, however p2 remains higher than p1. The 
increase in queuing thus raises the consumer surplus of type 1 users relative to the efficient 
allocation while that of type 2 users is lowered. Profit is unambiguously lowered. 
These results suggest that management would prefer to lower infrastructure than to 
introduce queuing in an effort to advantage type 1 users. The former provides a cost saving 
while the latter does not. Proposition 2(iii) confirms this intuition. In this part of the 
proposition, the time saving (ti) of each user types is proportional to their opportunity cost of 
time (wi). Thus infrastructure reductions and queuing have the same relative effect on pi.  
Proposition 2(iii) suggests that queuing is only used once the opportunity for inducing 
differences in pi from infrastructure reductions have been exhausted. If reductions in 
infrastructure levels alone are not sufficient to advantage type 1 users, queuing is also 
required. Specifically, infrastructure is chosen to maximise its net benefit (i.e. q(x,y) – Y(y)) 
to management, and the level of queuing is chosen to provide the optimal advantage to type 1 
users.  
The low weighting of operations and zero weighting of type 2 consumer surplus 
assumed in proposition 2 causes the total use level to differ from the efficient use level. In 
addition, the distortion of infrastructure and the presence of queuing yield an inefficient 
allocation across user groups. There is an inefficiently high level of use by type 1 users and 
an inefficiently low level of use by type 2 users. Furthermore, when queuing is present, the 
queuing cost a(w1x1+w2x2) represents an additional source of inefficiency. 
 The following proposition indicates that management’s attitude to the operational 
surplus is critical to determining if queuing can be present in equilibrium. 
Proposition 3: Suppose management is captured and operations orientated (m1=1, 
m2=0, m3=1). Then:  
(i)  P>c-q1 
(ii) infrastructure is downwardly (upwardly) distorted if t1<(>)t2 and  
(iii) no queuing occurs.  
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Under the assumptions of Proposition 3 management weighs operations and the consumer 
surplus of type 1 customers equally. However because the consumer surplus of type 2 users 
does not influence management utility, management increases its utility by raising price 
above marginal cost: when price is equal to marginal cost the loss of type 1 user’s consumer 
surplus is more than offset by the increase in profit.  Management can use infrastructure 
levels to advantage type 1 customers as discussed above. However, as queuing means a loss 
of potential profit, it is never used by management. 
 The following proposition highlights the role of managerial bias toward particular 
customer groups in determining the character of equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: Suppose management is unbiased and operations indifferent  
(m1=1, m2=1, m3<1). Then in equilibrium:  
(i) P < c – q1 
(ii) if t1<t2 infrastructure is downwardly (upwardly) distorted when the 
elasticity of demand of type 1 users is greater (less) than type 2 users  
(iii) for queuing to occur it is necessary that the elasticity of demand of type 1 
users is greater (less) than that of type 2 users  .  
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4 profit is less important to management than the 
consumer surplus of both customer types. Thus in equilibrium management sets price below 
the equilibrium level. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4 the main goal of management 
is to maximise total consumer surplus. This is achieved by lowering p1 relative to p2 if type 1 
has more elastic demand than type 2 users. As above, this can be achieved by downwardly 
distorting infrastructure or introducing queuing.   
 The final proposition describes equilibrium when management does not take account 
of the interests of either user type. 
Proposition 5: Suppose management is customer disinterested and operations 
orientated (m1=0, m2=0, m3=1). Then: 
(i) no queuing occurs and  
(ii) if t1<t2 then infrastructure is downwardly (upwardly) distorted when the 
elasticity of demand of type 1 customers is less (more) than type 2 customers.  
As with Proposition 3, no queuing occurs when management is operations orientated. 
Queuing represents a loss of prospective profit. By analogy with Ramsey pricing, the 
monopolist benefits by increasing sales to the group with the most inelastic demand. If type 1 
customers have the most inelastic demand, overall use can be shifted toward them by 
downwardly distorting infrastructure. 
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3. Policy Implications 
 A necessary condition for management to adopt a strategy that generates queuing is 
that the operational surplus, particularly profit, is under-weighted in its objective function. 
Queuing may occur if management is either captured or unbiased. Proposition 4 indicates that 
if management is unbiased, queuing is only observed when locals (type 1 customers) have 
more elastic demand than tourists (type 2 customers). This might occur if locals may have 
greater access to substitute activities, and hence have more elastic demand. However, it is 
exceptionally unlikely that this condition would hold universally. Given the widespread use 
of queuing as a ‘response’ to high demand, the model presented above suggests that, in many 
jurisdictions, management is commonly both captured and operations indifferent. 
It might be thought that a simple response to persistent queuing (which arises from 
inappropriate weights in the managerial objective function) would be to require management 
to price so as to eliminate queuing. This could be achieved by auctioning permits for 
recreational access, or allowing transferability and re-sale of permits. (One might imagine an 
e-bay style allocating mechanisms for allocating access at given periods of time.) However, 
although this policy would eliminate the waste from queuing, it need not necessarily yield an 
improvement in efficiency. The model suggests that if queuing is eliminated, management 
would shift the burden of manipulating the relative value of total price, pi, across customer 
types to infrastructure. Thus distortion in infrastructure would increase. Indeed the distortion 
in infrastructure could be sufficiently great that it outweighs the efficiency gains from the 
abolition of queuing. Thus requiring management to set the market clearing price need not, 
by itself, increase efficiency.  
 A questions suggested by the above analysis is whether management could raise 
efficiency by charging type 1 and type 2 customers different price (third degree price 
discrimination).  This would, of course, rely on management being able to identify each 
group and then legally act on this information. If management could do this: 
Proposition 6: Under third degree price discrimination there is no queuing and 
infrastructure is not distorted (irrespective of the values of mi). 
It is unnecessary for the manager to use either queuing or infrastructure to advantage one or 
both types of customers. This can be achieved more effectively by charging different prices 
to different customers. Of course this action itself results in a misallocation across customer 
types. So third degree price discrimination results in inefficiency. However third degree price 
discrimination does have the advantage that the bias of management is obvious to all 
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observers. If type 1 customers capture management they will be offered a lower price than 
type 2 customers.   
 The source of the inefficiency discussed above is, of course, the inappropriate weights 
management allocates to operations and the consumer surplus of all users in its decision 
making. Clearly the first best option would be to restructure the institutional arrangements so 
that managers weigh all users’ consumer surplus and operational surplus equally. A formal 
analysis of this is outside the scope of this paper, as the above model takes the institutional 
arrangements as exogenous. Indeed, as jurisdictions differ in their institutional arrangements, 
such an exercise would need to be conducted on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis.  
Nonetheless it is worth noting that such a change is likely to be far from 
straightforward. For instance, suppose legislation was changed to require management to 
introduce administrative processes that ensure all interests are appropriately accounted for. In 
principle this policy would achieve an efficient outcome (whether management was currently 
captured or unbiased). However such a proposal faces a number of obstacles in practice. 
Firstly, it is not clear that the economic measures of profit and consumer surplus and the 
concept of common weights could be effectively translated into legislation. (For instance, the 
recent USREA emphasises (pecuniary) cost recovery as a basis for recreational fees, rather 
than efficient resource allocation.) If economic concepts are not accurately translated in to 
new legislation, it might itself be a source of additional distortion in the weightings. Even if 
such legalisation was written and passed, it may not be effective in the face of differences in 
political influence between groups. Politically powerless groups may not be able to ensure 
their interests are accounted for in decision making. Further, in practice these requirements 
may be difficult to implement. They require management to identify not only the interests of 
all current groups using the natural area, but also the interest of prospective users who are not 
currently using the natural area. Efficiency requires that management identify these groups 
and estimate their demand.  This could be a difficult task, given that outdoor recreation is an 
experience good, and prospective users might not be fully aware of their prospective demand. 
In practice, therefore, legislative attempts to ensure that management gives equal weight to 
the interests of all groups may only be partially successful.  
 In summary, none of the mechanisms considered above would entirely overcome the 
bias in managerial preferences and result in an efficient allocation. They do not allow for the 
full benefit of recreation derived by type 2 users to be accounted for in equilibrium. However 
the above discussion suggests that a combination of appropriate legislative and administrative 
reform and use of third degree price discrimination might ameliorate some of the undesirable 
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effects of managerial bias. While legislative and administrative reform may not completely 
eliminate managerial bias (as discussed above), it might nonetheless cause management’s 
weightings to be more balanced. Price discrimination makes any managerial bias apparent, 
and thus may provide a moral pressure on managers to be more balanced in their decision 
making. The use of price discrimination also eliminates the loss of efficiency due to queuing 
and infrastructure distortion.  
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4. Discussion 
A popular rhetorical justification for the low price charged for recreational access to 
national parks is that parks should be “available to all”. Indeed this sentiment is to some 
extent reflected in legislation. However these arguments ignore the environmental and social 
constraints imposed by the finite nature of the resource. To maintain the quality of recreation 
and provide protection to the environment some rationing must occur. The central economic 
question is how this rationing is best achieved.  
This paper presents a theory of the pricing of publicly owned natural areas that allows 
for a variety of influences on managerial objectives. In the model, utilising queuing and 
infrastructure distortion enables management to change the relative total price faced by 
different user groups. In contrast to the rhetoric claim above, the existence of a low price 
combined with queuing and infrastructure distortion can be interpreted as a mechanism to 
advantage a dominant group of users over other groups.  
Advancing the interests of the dominant group of users through ‘non-price’ means 
leads to inefficiency. When it occurs, queuing represents a clear waste of resources. The 
presence of infrastructure distortion is harder to identify, and the inefficiency is less apparent. 
An inefficiently low level of infrastructure can always be (incorrectly) justified by 
management as being appropriate for environment and/or social reasons. For example it is 
easily claimed that “we can’t place a hut in this region as it will interfere with the wilderness 
character of the region required by the management plan”.  The use of third degree price 
discrimination (where practical) has the advantage that the result of the bias in managerial 
objectives is transparent and there is no incentive for management to adopt queuing or 
infrastructure distortion. It should be emphasised, however, that adoption of third degree 
price discrimination cannot be guaranteed to lead to increased efficiency. 
It is argued in this paper that, in many jurisdictions, the dominant user group typically 
has a relatively low opportunity cost of time. Demographic changes and/or technological 
improvements could change this. For instance, improvements in information technology 
might allow skilled (and thus high wage) users to live in remote areas, thus change the socio-
economic characteristics of the ‘locals’ compared to the ‘tourists’. In this event queuing is no 
longer optimal as a rationing mechanism. However, if local knowledge substituted for 
infrastructure, it would still be the case that (high wage) locals would benefit less from 
infrastructure than do tourists. In this case infrastructure would be downwardly distorted. For 
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instance, locals would prefer reduced information (e.g. signage) about the natural area, thus 
reducing demand and the equilibrium price.  
An alternative interpretation of the model presented in this paper is that management 
acts in the interests of the ‘poor’. In this interpretation the ‘poor’ represent user group 1, and 
they only appear to be dominant because management is particularly concerned that they 
receive ‘fair’ access. However this argument stands in contradiction to standard economic 
reasoning, in which economic agents act in their own self interest. Consider the model of this 
paper being extended to include three classes of user: the poor, locals (middle income) and 
tourists (high income). If the locals are dominant, the pricing and infrastructure decisions 
made by management would be much as described in this paper. The political influence of 
locals will have, only incidentally, benefited the poor. However, claiming that the low price is 
intended to help the poor provides a convenient justification for management’s inefficient 
pricing and infrastructure decisions.   
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Appendix: Mathematical Proofs and Derivations 
The first order condition for the optimisation problem (9). 
 
The Lagrangian is: 
 
L=m1v1(p1)+m2v2(p2)+m3{(P-c)[x1(p1)+x2(p2)]-Y(y)+q(x1(p1)+x2(p2),y)}+μa  
 
where μ≥0 is the Lagrange multipliers. The Kuhn Tucker conditions yield: 
 
∂L∂P = -m1x1(p1)-m2x2(p2) + m3{x1(p1)+x2(p2)+(P-c)[x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)]+q1[x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)]} 
 
∂L∂P = 0 ⇒  m3[(P-c)+q1] = (m1-m3)x1(p1)+(m2-m3)x2(p2)x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)     (A1) 
 
∂L∂y = m1t1x1(p1)+m2t2x2(p2)  
+ m3{(P-c)[t1x′1(p1)+t2x′2(p2)]-Y′(y)+q1[t1x′1(p1)+t2x′2(p2)] + q2} 
 
∂L∂y = 0 ⇒ 
 
m3{Y′(y)-q2(x,y)-t1x1(p1)-t2x1(p2) } 
=(m1-m3)t1x1(p1)+(m2-m3)t2x1(p2)+m3((P-c)+q1)[t1x′1(p1)+t2x′2(p2)] 
 
Substituting (A1) gives 
 
m3{Y′(y)-q2(x,y)-t1x1(p1)-t2x2(p2)}= (t1-t2)Γ     (A2) 
 
where Γ= x1(p1)x2(p2)x′1(p1)+x′2(p2) ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞(m1-m3)x′1(p1)x1(p1)-(m2-m3)
x′2(p2)
x2(p2)    (A3) 
 
Γ is the difference in weighted demand elasticities.  
 
∂L∂a = -m1w1x1(p1)-m2w2x2(p2) + m3((P-c)+q1)[w1x′1(p1)+w2x′2(p2)]+ μ 
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∂L∂a = 0 ⇒ 
 
μ = m1w1x1(p1)+m2w2x2(p2) - m3((P-c)+q1)[w1x′1(p1)+w2x′2(p2)] (A4) 
 
or: 
 
μ - m3(w1x1(p1)+w2x2(p2)) 
=(m1-m3)w1x1(p1)+(m2-m3)w2x1(p2)+m3((P-c)+q1)[w1x′1(p1)+w2x′2(p2)] (A5)  
Substituting (A1) gives: 
 
μ - m3(w1x1(p1)+w2x2(p2))=(w1-w2)Γ  (A6) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
When management is unbiased and operations orientated then m1= m2= m3=1. Then (A1) 
gives: 
 
P  = c - q1 
 When λ=0 then P=c and x<x_. If λ>0 then x=x_. Given m1= m2= m3=1 then Γ= 0 hence:  
 
Y′(y) = q2(x,y) + t1x1(p1)+t2x2(p2)   || 
 
A test for infrastructure distortion. 
The surplus is given by: 
 
S = v1(p1)+v2(p2)+(P-c)[x1(p1)+x2(p2)]-Y(y) + q(x(P,a,y),y) 
 
Hence: 
 
∂S/∂y  = t1x1(p1)+t2x2(p2)-Y′(y) + q2(x,y) 
+(P+q1-c)[(x′1(p1)+x′2(p2))dP/dy+(w1x′1(p1)+w2x′2(p2))da/dy+t1x′1(p1)+t2x′2(p2)] 
 
It is assumed total use is held constant. Hence 
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[x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)]dP/dy + [w1x′1(p1)+w2x′2(p2)]da/dy + t1x′1(p1)+t2x′2(p2) = 0 
 
Hence: 
∂S/∂y = t1x1(p1) + t2x2(p2) -Y′(y) + q2 
 
Infrastructure is thus downwardly (un-, upwardly) distorted if: 
 
Y′(y) < (=,>) q2(x(P,a,y),y) + t1x1(P+(a+a1)w1-t1y)+t2x2(P+(a+a2)w2-t2y) 
 
That is, infrastructure is downwardly distorted in equilibrium if the marginal cost of 
infrastructure is less than the sum of marginal environmental quality and marginal consumer 
surplus. By (A2) infrastructure is downwardly (un-, upwardly) distorted if, in equilibrium,  
 
(t1-t2)Γ < (=,>) 0.     (A7) 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
When management is captured then m1= 1 and m2=0, and operations orientated then m3<1. 
By (A1): 
m3[(P-c)+q1] = 
(1-m3)x1(p1) -m3x2(p2)
x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)    (A8)  
and by (A3): 
 
Γ= x1(p1)x2(p2)x′1(p1)+x′2(p2) ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞(1-m3)x′1(p1)x1(p1)+ m3
x′2(p2)
x2(p2)  > 0 
 
(i) If t1< (>) t2  then the LHS of (A7) is negative (positive), and hence infrastructure is 
downwardly (upwardly) distorted.  
 
(ii) From (A6) it is necessary that w1<w2 for μ=0. 
 
(iii) If queuing occurs by (A6), and using wi=αti: 
 
(t1-t2)Γ + m3(t1x1(p1)+t2x2(p2))=0  
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Then by (A2) Y′(y)=q2(x,y).    || 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
In this case m1= m3= 1 and m2=0. Hence by (A1): 
 
P-c+q1 = 
-x2(p2)
x′1(p1)+x′2(p2) > 0. 
 
and: 
 
Γ= m3 x1(p1)x2(p2)x′1(p1)+x′2(p2) ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞x′2(p2)
x2(p2)  >0.  
 
(i) Rearranging yields P = c - q1  - 
x2(p2)
x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)  > c- q1. 
 
(ii) As Γ>0, then the LHS of (A7) is negative (positive) if t1< (>) t2  , and hence infrastructure 
is downwardly (upwardly) distorted 
 
(iii) By (A4) μ > 0 as P-c+q1>0. Hence no queuing occurs. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
(i) From (A1): 
 
P-c+q1= 
(1-m3)[x1(p1) + x2(p2)]
x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)  < 0. 
 
Hence P < c - q1 
 
(ii) From (A3): 
 
Γ= (1-m3)x1(p1)x2(p2)x′1(p1)+x′2(p2)  ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞x′1(p1)
x1(p1) - 
x′2(p2)
x2(p2)  = 
(1-m3)x1(p1)x2(p2)
(x1(p1)+x2(p2))εx  (ε
x
1-εx2)  
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Thus Γ> (=,<) 0 if  εx2<(=,>) εx1. Thus by (A2) when t1<t2 infrastructure is downwadly (un-, 
upwardly) distorted if εx2<(=,>) εx1. 
 
(iii) From (A5) it is a necessary condition that εx2<εx1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
In this case m1= m2= 0 and m3=1.  
 
P-c + q1 = 
P
εx >0 
 
(i) From (A5) then, in this case, μ>0 and there is thus no queuing. 
 
(ii) Further: 
 
Γ= x1(p1)x2(p2)x′1(p1)+x′2(p2) ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞x′2(p2)
x2(p2) - 
x′1(p1)
x1(p1)  = 
x1(p1)x2(p2)
(x1(p1)+x2(p2))εx (ε
x
2-εx1)  
 
Thus Γ> (=,<) 0 if  εx2 >(=,<)  εx1  || 
 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
Suppose management charges type i customers price Pi. In this case (1) is modified so that: 
 
pi(P,a,y) = Pi + aiwi + awi - tiy   
 
The Lagrangian for management’s optimisation problem is: 
 
L=m1v1(p1)+m2v2(p2)+m3{(P1-c)x1(p1)+(P2-c)x2(p2)-Y(y) + q(x,y)}+μa  
 
where μ≥0 is the Lagrange multipliers. The Kuhn Tucker conditions yield the first order 
condition for the price charge type i users: 
 
∂L∂Pi = -mixi(pi)+ m3{x1(p1)+(Pi-c + q1)x′i(pi)} 
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∂L∂Pi = 0 ⇒  m3(Pi-c + q1)  = (mi-m3)xi(pi)x′i(pi)     (A9) 
 
The first order condition for infrastructure is: 
 
∂L∂y = m1t1x1(p1)+m2t2x2(p2)+m3{(P1-c)t1x′1(p1)+(P2-c)t2x′2(p2)-Y′(y) 
+q1[t1x′1(p1)+t2x′2(p2)] + q2} 
 
∂L∂y = 0 ⇒ 
 
m3{Y′(y)-q2-t1x1(p1)-t2x1(p2)} 
=(m1-m3)t1x1(p1)+(m2-m3)t2x1(p2)+ m3(P1-c+ q1)t1x′1(p1)+m3(P2-c+q1)t2x′2(p2) 
 
Substituting (A9) gives 
 
Y′(y) = q2(x,y) + t1x1(p1) + t2x2(p2)      
 
Hence there is no distortion in infrastructure. 
 
The first order condition for queuing is: 
 
∂L∂a = -m1w1x1(p1)-m2w2x2(p2) + m3(P1-c+q1)w1x′1(p1)+m3(P1-c+q1)w2x′2(p2)+ μ 
 
∂L∂a = 0 ⇒ 
 
μ = m1w1x1(p1)+m2w2x2(p2) - m3(P1-c+q1)w1x′1(p1) - m3(P1-c) +q1)w2x′2(p2) (A4) 
 
 
Substituting (A9) gives: 
 
μ = m3(w1x1(p1)+w2x2(p2)) > 0. 
 
Hence no queuing occurs.     ||
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